
Towards *validated* network configurations with NCGuard



Laurent Vanbever, Grégory Pardoen and Olivier Bonaventure http://inl.info.ucl.ac.be

WODNAFO'10, Adelaide Mon 8 Feb 2010

Human factors are responsible for 50 to 80 percent of network device outages

Juniper Networks, What's Behind Network Downtime?, 2008

Configuring networks is like writing a distributed program in assembly language

Sihyung Lee, ICC, 2008

Current approaches could be divided into *static analysis* and data mining

Use pattern matching to find known misconfigurations

For example, look for typing error in network advertisement

Compare configurations to given specifications

For example, every router must belong to the iBGP full-mesh

Pros and cons

- Effective
- You need to know what a valid network is
- How do you deal with heterogenous languages ?

Current approaches could be divided into static analysis, and *data mining*

Statistical analysis of configurations

e.g., throw error if an instruction is defined everywhere but on one device

Infer network-specific policies for deviation analysis Try to understand the meaning of the network

Pros and cons

- Completely independent of *a priori* specifications
- Too verbose. People are flooded with false positives
- How do you deal with heterogenous languages ?

This situation *contrasts* with development in software engineering

Requirements describe precisely systems behavior lack of equivalence in network configuration

Validation techniques for systematic error detection currently, devices perform only *syntax* validation

New development schemes improve efficiency the CLI approach hasn't change very much since ~1990

Our approach: a *high-level* representation with a *validation* and *generation* engine


High-level representation abstracts useless details it could be used as a *documented* view of a network

Validation (rules-based) ensures specifications are respected


and that they will be respected in the future


Generation produces low-level configurations


that are understandable by the components



























Towards validated network configurations



High-level representation

Hide useless details


Configuration validation

A rule-based approach

Configuration generation

The use of *templates*

Towards validated network configurations



High-level representation

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The use of *templates*

High-level representation is a *concise*, and *practical* view of a network


High-level means no more redundancy

now, you can configure an iBGP full-mesh in a single line

High-level means vendor-independent

no need to bother yourself with language details

Towards validated network configurations



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The use of *templates*

Validation is performed by using *rules*

A *rule* is a condition that must be met by the *high-level* representation

Many rules follow well-known patterns

Presence or non-presence

Each router must have a loopback interface

Uniqueness

IP address must be unique

Symmetry

MTU must be equal on both sides of a link

Custom

Each OSPF area must be connected to the backbone area

Structural constraints (XML Schema): Structural rules


Structural constraints (XML Schema): Structural rules

Queries on the representation (XQuery): Query rules

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	PRESENCE NON-PRESENCE	UNIQUENESS	SYMMETRY	сиѕтом
STRUCTURAL RULES	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
QUERY RULES	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
LANGUAGE RULES				\checkmark




A configuration node is an element of the high-level representation

• A node is composed of attributes

A scope is a set of configuration nodes






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




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


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
• A node is composed of attributes

A scope is a set of configuration nodes

Each router **must** have a loopback interface



Each router **must** have a loopback interface



There is at least one configuration node respecting a given condition in each *descendants* set.

 $\forall x \in \text{SCOPE } \exists y \in \texttt{descendants}(x) : C_{\text{presence}}(T, y)$

Each router **must** have a loopback interface


 $\forall x \in \texttt{ROUTERS} \ \exists y \in \texttt{interfaces}(x) \ : y.id = loopback$

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


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
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```
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```


```
<rule id="LOOPBACK_INTERFACE_ON_EACH_NODE" type="presence">
<presence>
<scope>ALL_NODES</scope>
<descendants>interfaces/interface</descendants>
<condition>@id='loopback'</condition>
</presence>
</rule>
```

Uniqueness rules verify the cardinality of a field among a set of nodes


Routers interfaces identifiers *must* be unique




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


Check if there is no two configuration nodes with identical value of *field*

 $\forall x \in \text{SCOPE } \forall y \in d(x) : \neg(\exists z_{\neq y} \in d(x) : y.field = z.field)$

Uniqueness of routers interfaces identifiers

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


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


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


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


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Symmetry rules verify the equality of a field among a set of nodes

Such rules can be checked **implicitly** by the high-level representation

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MTU *must* be equal on both ends of a link

Symmetry rules verify the equality of a field among a set of nodes

Such rules can be checked **implicitly** by the high-level representation

MTU *must* be equal on both ends of a link

Automatically checked by modeling it once at the link level, instead of twice at the interfaces level

Hypothesis: duplication phase is correct

Custom rules check advanced conditions


They are expressed in a query or programming language

Example: All OSPFs areas must be connected to the backbone

Over 100 rules were written for a network composed of 9 routers

Туре	Total
Presence, non-presence	97
Uniqueness	20
Symmetry	10
Custom	9
Total	136

Towards validated network configurations



High-level representation

Hide useless details

Configuration validation

A rule-based approach

Configuration generation The use of *templates*

Configurations are automatically produced based on the high-level representation


We use intermediate representations

it represents the high-level configuration of one device


Templates translate them into configuration files templates are vendor-specific

To support a new vendor, add a new template we have a template for Juniper and Cisco configurations

Low-level configurations are automatically generated




Low-level configurations are automatically generated



Demonstration

Towards validated network configurations



High-level representation

Hide useless details

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The use of *templates*

Producing validated network configurations is *possible*

Use high-level representations

suppress redundancy, hide useless details

Validate the representation

really easy to add rules (most are a few lines length)

Generate low-level configurations automatically flexibility is kept by letting you modify the templates

What is next?


Improve the high-level representation ? XML may not be the most appropriate...

An open-source library of validation rules ? *e.g.,* rules checking the BCP of OSPF, BGP, etc.

How do we validate dynamic properties ?

Can we deploy generated configurations automatically ? and, if possible, *without* traffic disruption

Towards validated network configurations



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Thank you for your attention Any questions ?